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GENDER-BASED PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
UNDER UNITED STATES v. DE GROSS, 960
F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1992)
The right to exercise peremptory challenges gives both parties at
trial an opportunity to reject jurors from the petit jury without cause.1
The accepted rationale for this practice is to allow a party to dismiss a
potential juror based upon the party's intuitive or subjective impression
that the juror is not impartial.2 The ultimate goal is to impanel a jury
that both parties consider fair.3 The exercise of peremptory challenges
is, however, subject to abuse when parties attempt to use the challenges
not as a method of selecting an impartial juror, but as means of elimi-
1. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow both the government and a crim-
inal defendant to make peremptory challenges. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b)-(c). Each party
is allowed a limited number of peremptory challenges. FED. R. CRiM. P. 24(b) allows
the government and the defendant varying numbers of peremptory challenges depend-
ing on the severity of the punishment. 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1988) authorizes the use of
peremptory challenges in federal civil cases.
For a detailed discussion of the history of peremptory challenges, see Swain v. Ala-
bama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-17 (1965). See generally 47 AM. JUR. 2D, Jury § 233 (1969)
(discussing the general principle of peremptory challenges).
2. "The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised with-
out a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control."
Swain, 380 U.S. at 220. See also Barbara A. Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Won-
derful Power," 27 STAN. L. REv. 545, 553 (1975) (observing that peremptory challenges
allow each party to rely on motivations or stereotypes which they do not wish to pub-
licly articulate).
Prejudice is inherent in the exercise of a peremptory challenge. Blackstone identified
one of the reasons for the peremptory strike:
As every one must be sensible, what sudden impressions and unaccountable
prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another; and
how necessary it is, that a prisoner (when put to defend his life) should have a good
opinion of his jury, the want of which might totally disconcert him; the law wills
not that he should be tried by any one man against whom he has conceived a preju-
dice, even without being able to assign a reason for such his dislike.
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 353 (emphasis added).
3. "The right of challenge is almost essential for the purpose of securing fairness
and impartiality in a trial." WILLIAM FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 145
(1875).
In criminal cases, it has long been considered paramount that the defendant perceive
the jury to be impartial. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 2.
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nating certain jurors and impanelling those who are potentially more
partial toward their cause.' The United States Supreme Court has de-
clared unequivocally that a party, whether in a civil or criminal case,
may not use the peremptory challenge to remove jurors on the basis of
race.' In United States v. De Gross, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
extended this prohibition to proscribe peremptory challenges on the
basis of gender.'
In De Gross, the government objected during voir dire to De Gross'
use of eight peremptory challenges7 to strike male venirepersons.8 The
district court found that the defendant's pattern of striking males es-
tablished a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination.9 Because De
Gross offered no explanation, the court disallowed the eighth chal-
4. "[N]either side really wishes an impartial jury, but rather wishes to do everything
possible to find jurors more attuned to its world view." Richard Singer, Peremptory
Holds: A Suggestion (Only Half Specious) of a Solution to the Discriminatory Use of
Peremptory Challenges, 62 U. DET. L. Rav. 275, 288 (1985). See also Frederick L.
Brown et al., The Peremptory Challenge as Manipulative Device in Criminal Trials:
Traditional Use or Abuse, 14 NEw ENG. L. REV. 192 (1978) (advocating elimination of
prosecutorial use of peremptory challenges because of discriminatory use to exclude
blacks and other minorities); Roger S. Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41
S. CAL. L. REv. 235 (1968) (explaining how peremptory challenges were used to main-
tain all white juries).
5. See Georgia v. McCollom, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992) (holding that a criminal de-
fendant's exercise of a peremptory challenge was a "state action" for purposes of the
equal protection clause, and that he was therefore prohibited from exercising such a
challenge in a racially discriminatory manner); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,
111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991) (holding that private civil litigants may not use peremptory
challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of race); Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991)
(holding that criminal defendants may contest race-based exclusions of jurors exercised
through peremptory challenges whether or not defendant and the excluded jurors are of
the same race); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (finding that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause forbids a prosecutor in a criminal case from challenging potential jurors
solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be
unable to consider the State's case against a black defendant impartially).
6. 960 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc). Other courts confronted with this issue
have refrained from extending the prohibition against challenges based upon race to
challenges based upon gender. See infra notes 54-61 and accompanying text for illustra-
tive cases and their reasoning.
7. The court refers to "a party's attempt to excuse a venireperson as a peremptory
challenge" and the court's acceptance of a party's challenge as a peremptory strike. Id.
at 1435-36 n.l.
8. Id. at 1435-36. The defendant, Juana Espericueta De Gross, was accused of aid-
ing and abetting the transportation of an illegal alien. Id. at 1435. She exercised seven
strikes against male venirepersons before the government objected to her eighth at-
tempt. Id. at 1435-36.
9. Id. at 1436. The government initially argued that the defendant's strikes against
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lenge.1 ° Later, De Gross objected to the government's challenge of a
Hispanic woman."1 The prosecution explained that its challenge was
made in an attempt to impanel "a more representative community of
men and women on the jury." 2 The court accepted the explanation
and dismissed the Hispanic venirewoman 3 The impaneled jury of
three men and nine women convicted De Gross.14 The Ninth Circuit
reversed the conviction and held that equal protection principles pro-
hibit any party from striking venirepersons on the basis of gender. 5
Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's refusal of
De Gross' challenge to a male venireperson and disagreed with the dis-
trict court's decision to allow the government to strike a Hispanic
venireperson on the basis of her gender. 6
The De Gross decision analyzes the principles of equal protection in
the context of race-based peremptory challenges and finds them equally
applicable in the context of gender-based peremptory strikes.1 7 Dating
males proved her discriminatory intent to exclude them in violation of their Fifth
Amendment right to equal protection of the laws. Id.
For a discussion of the requirements for a prima facie case of purposeful discrimina-
tion, see infra text accompanying notes 27-30.
10. 960 F.2d at 1436.
11. Id. The woman challenged was the only Hispanic remaining on the venire. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. De Gross timely appealed, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
and remanded. United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990), reh'q granted
930 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1991). On appeal, De Gross argued that the district court erred
in denying her peremptory challenge of a male venireperson and in allowing the govern-
ment's challenge of a Hispanic woman. 960 F.2d at 1436, 1442.
15. 960 F.2d at 1439. Although beyond the scope of this Comment, De Gross also
held that a criminal defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges is "state action" for
purposes of the equal protection clause. Id. at 1440-42. The concurring opinion dis-
agreed on this issue. Id. at 1443-48 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). Two months later, the
Supreme Court came to the same conclusion as the De Gross majority in Georgia v.
McCollom, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2354-57 (1992), but not without vigorous dissent. See id.
at 2361-64 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 2364-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For a pre-
McCollom discussion of why criminal defendants should not be considered state actors
for peremptory challenge purposes, see Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting a Criminal De-
fendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges: On Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal Trial,
102 HARv. L. Rv. 808 (1989).
16. 960 F.2d at 1442-43. The court concluded that peremptory strikes based upon
a person's gender violate the defendant's and the excluded venireperson's right to equal
protection of the laws. Id. at 1437-38.
17. Id. at 1437-39. The DeGross court noted:
Equal protection principles forbid racially discriminatory peremptory strikes, in
1993]
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back to 1880, the Supreme Court has consistently prohibited race-
based discrimination in the jury selection process."8 In 1965, the
Supreme Court in Swain v. Alabama19 held that the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits the use of peremptory challenges based on race to ex-
clude otherwise qualified jurors.20 Under Swain, a defendant alleging
violations of equal protection had to show that the prosecutor discrimi-
nated against members of the defendant's race for reasons that were
unrelated to the outcome of the case.2 The defendant had to show a
pattern, not confined to the facts of the defendant's case, of the system-
atic denial to blacks of the same rights and opportunities to participate
on juries as those enjoyed by whites.
In Batson v. Kentucky,23 the Supreme Court affirmed Swain and
part because racial discrimination during jury selection (1) harms the excluded
venirepersons, (2) undermines public confidence in the judicial system, and (3)
stimulates community prejudice. Because all of these evils also result from per-
emptory strikes based on gender, ... equal protection principles compel us to
prohibit peremptory strikes on the basis of gender.
Id. at 1438 (citations and footnotes omitted).
18. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). In Strauder, the Court held
that a West Virginia statute which allowed only white males to serve on juries violated
the black defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. Case law sub-
sequently expanding this jurisprudence include Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935)
(holding that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees defendant that the state will not
exclude members of his race from jury venire on the false assumption that said members
are not qualified to serve as jurors); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953) (prohibiting
exclusion of black jurors from state petit jury); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625
(1972) (prohibiting exclusion of jurors on basis of race from state grand jury); and Pe-
ters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (overturning conviction of white male on equal protec-
tion grounds because blacks were excluded from state grand jury).
19. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
20. In Swain, an all white jury convicted a black defendant of raping a white wo-
man and sentenced him to death. The prosecutor used peremptory challenges to re-
move from the jury panel the only six blacks eligible to serve. Id. at 205. The Court
stated that "a State's purposeful or deliberate denial to Negroes on account of race of
participation as jurors in the administration of justice violates the Equal Protection
Clause." Id. at 203-04.
21. Id. at 224.
22. Id. at 223-24. The Court noted that this could be proved, for example, by show-
ing that "the prosecutor..., in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever
the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be, is responsible for the re-
moval of Negroes who have been selected as qualified jurors .... with the result that no
Negroes ever serve on petit juries .... "
23. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In Batson, an all white jury convicted the defendant of
second degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods after the prosecutor used peremptory
challenges to strike all four black persons on the venire. Id. at 83.
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held that the use of peremptory challenges by prosecutors for the pur-
pose of excluding blacks from juries violates the equal protection rights
of black defendants, as well as those of the excluded jurors.24 How-
ever, the Batson Court rejected the evidentiary burden that the Swain
Court placed on a defendant and adopted a more relaxed standard.25
The Court stated that a defendant may establish a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury based solely on
the evidence pertaining to the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges at the defendant's own trial.26 To prove a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination in a prosecutor's use of peremptory chal-
lenges, the Batson Court articulated the following standard.27 First,
the defendant must be a member of a constitutionally cognizable group
and show that the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to re-
move from the venire members of the defendant's race.28 Second, the
defendant is entitled to rely on the fact that the peremptory challenges
constitute a jury selection practice that permits those to discriminate
who are of a mind to discriminate. 29 Third, the defendant must show
that these facts, and any other relevant circumstances, raise an infer-
ence that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the venireperson
from the petit jury on account of his race."0 In Powers v. Ohio,31 the
Court modified the Batson test and no longer required defendants to
show that they share the excluded juror's race.32 Once these require-
24. Id. at 87. There has been a sequence of cases which have followed and ex-
panded the principles of Batson. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990) (stating in
dicta that although defendant had no Sixth Amendment claim, a prosecutor may not
use race-based peremptory challenges even when the accused is of a different race from
that of the prospective juror). See also supra note 5 for cases following Batson.
See generally James 0. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, Use of Peremptory Challenge to Ex-
clude From Jury Persons Belonging to a Class or Race, 79 A.L.R.3D 14 (1977) (analyz-
ing cases that decided the issue of whether it is constitutional for the prosecution or
defendant to use peremptory challenges to exclude members of a race or class from the
petit jury, whether in a single case or in a series of cases).
25. 476 U.S. at 90-96.
26. Id. at 96.
27. Id. at 96-97.
28. Id. at 96.
29. Id. (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
30. 476 U.S. at 96. The court said that these three elements create "the necessary
inference of purposeful discrimination." Id. To come to its decision, the lower courts
should consider all relevant circumstances. Id. at 96-97.
31. 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
32. Id. at 1373.
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ments are met, the burden shifts to the prosecution to enunciate a race-
neutral reason for the strike.33
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the harmful effects of dis-
criminatory peremptory challenges meant to exclude blacks solely be-
cause of their race. The exclusion of blacks deprives the jurors of their
right to equal protection,34 and deprives the defendants of both their
right to an impartial jury,35 as well as one chosen in a non-discrimina-
tory manner.36 Discrimination in the exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges also creates suspicion about the integrity of the judicial process37
and the fairness of the proceedings 3 and undermines the public's con-
33. 476 U.S. at 97. Cf. Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991) (holding
that the question of whether the defendant made a prima facie showing that the prose-
cution used peremptory challenges to exclude latino potential jurors was moot since the
prosecution had offered a racially neutral explanation and the trial court had ruled on
the ultimate question of intentional discrimination).
34. See also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2080 (1991)
(holding that use of peremptory challenges by private litigants in civil cases in order to
exclude jurors on account of race violates the potential jurors' equal protection rights);
Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1370 (1991) (stating that "[a]n individual juror does
not have a right to sit on any particular petit jury, but he or she does possess the right
not to be excluded from one on account of race"); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87
(1986) (noting that denying a person of jury service on account of race unconstitution-
ally discriminates against the excluded juror); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303,
308 (1880) ("The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied by a
statute all right (sic) to participate in the administration of the law, as jurors, because of
their color, though they are citizens, and may be in other respects fully qualified to...
equal ... justice....").
35. See Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1372 (1991) (explaining that the "purpose
of the jury system is to impress upon the criminal defendant and the community as a
whole that a verdict.., is given... by persons who are fair").
36. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-86 (1986) (noting that a defendant does
have the right to be tried by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to nondiscrim-
inatory criteria). Cf. Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 321 (1906) (holding that defendant
is "entitled to demand" a grand and petit jury chosen without race discrimination); Ex
parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880) (restating that a defendant's equal protection
rights include the freedom from race discrimination in jury selection).
37. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that:
Race discrimination within the courtroom raises serious questions as to the fairness
of the proceedings conducted there. Racial bias mars the integrity of the judicial
system and prevents the idea of democratic government from becoming a reality.
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (citing Rose v. Mitchell, 443
U.S. 545, 556 (1979); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940)).
38. See Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1371 (1991) (stating that "[a]ctive discrim-
ination by a prosecutor during [jury selection] ... invites cynicism respecting the jury's
neutrality and its obligation to adhere to the law).
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fidence in the fairness of the overall judicial system.39
Discrimination on the basis of gender also falls within the proscrip-
tions of the Equal Protection Clause. In the seminal case of Reed v.
Reed," the Supreme Court held that an Idaho probate code statute
which favored the appointment of men over women as estate adminis-
trators, when women were equally qualified, violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.41 By treating similarly situ-
ated persons differently on account of their gender, when no important
governmental interest is involved, the challenged activity violates the
Equal Protection Clause.42 No state actor may make classifications or
distinctions based on gender unless such distinctions facilitate impor-
tant governmental objectives and are tailored to achieve those
objectives.43
39. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 (stating that "[s]election procedures that purpose-
fully exclude black persons from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of
our system of justice"); see also Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946)
(explaining that systematic exclusion of women causes injury to the defendant, the jury
system, the law as an institution, the community at large, and "the democratic ideal
reflected in the processes of our courts").
40. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
41. Id. at 76. See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (ruling that the
statutory presumption that an unwed father is unfit for custody purposes violates the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment).
Subsequent cases extended the prohibition against gender-based discrimination to
federal actions. See, eg., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (finding that the
military's distinction based on sex of spouse in determining espousal benefits was viola-
tive of Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause).
The Supreme Court delineated the bounds of permissible gender discrimination on
behalf of the state in Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), which upheld a Florida
statute that provided a $500 property tax exemption to women because of the legislative
intent to favor widows, upon whom "the loss [of a husband] imposes a disproportionate
burden." Id. at 355. See also Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (holding that
the military may formulate mandatory discharge rules that take into account gender
differences).
42. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (holding that a Utah statute providing for
different ages of majority between boys and girls was unconstitutional under the Four-
teenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause); Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636
(1975) (holding that a social security scheme which provided survivors benefits to a
widow based on a man's earnings, but denied such benefits to a deceased female earner's
widower unconstitutionally discriminated against female workers by affording them less
protection for their survivors and was not justifiable by a generalization that male work-
ers' earnings are vital to their families support while female workers' earnings are not).
43. "[T]o withstand constitutional chaenge... classifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement
of those objectives." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (invalidating an
1993]
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With respect to the venire selection process, the case law addressing
gender discrimination parallels that of race discrimination. In 1946,
the Supreme Court addressed discrimination against women in jury
service in Ballard v. United States.' In Ballard, the Court held that
when women are eligible for jury service under local law, federal courts
must not exclude them.45 The intentional and systematic exclusion of
women from the federal grand jury, like the exclusion of racial minori-
ties, deprives the jury system of the broad base intended by Congress. 46
Oklahoma statute which allowed women to purchase 3.2% beer at age 18, but prohib-
ited men from purchasing until age 21).
Race-based distinctions are subject to "strict" equal protection analysis, particularly
in cases involving exclusions from jury service. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11
(1966) (stating that "the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications...
be subjected to the 'most rigid scrutiny"' (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944)); see also Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (striking as unconsti-
tutional the systematic exclusion of blacks from the petit jury). In contrast, gender-
based distinctions are generally subject to less strict, or "intermediate," scrutiny. Craig,
429 U.S. at 197. See also Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (holding that a
Louisiana statute giving a unilateral right to a husband to encumber jointly-owned
property without the wife's consent violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Pro-
tection Clause). But see Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (holding that a New
York statute distinguishing between unwed fathers and unwed mothers as to adoption
rights was violative of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause because it
bore no substantial relation to any important state interest); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268
(1979) (holding that an Alabama statute requiring a husband, but never the wife, to pay
alimony violates equal protection principles); and Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199
(1977) (holding that provisions of the Social Security Act under which survivors bene-
fits based on the earnings of a deceased man were payable to his widow but earnings of a
deceased woman were not payable to her widower unless he was receiving at least half
his support from her violate due process and equal protection); Califano v. Webster, 430
U.S. 313 (1977) (holding that Social Security provisions allowing women, but not men,
to eliminate additional low-earning years from calculation of retirement benefits in or-
der to rectify effects of past discrimination did not violate the Fifth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause; this gender classification served an important governmental interest
and was substantially related to the achievement of the stated objectives).
44. 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
45. Id. at 190-96.
46. Id. at 195. Although the Court decided Ballard based upon its supervisory
powers over the federal courts, rather than on equal protection principles, the language
of the decision suggests that an equal protection argument may also be made:
But if the shoe were on the other foot, who would claim that a jury was truly
representative of the community if all men were intentionally and systematically
excluded from the panel? The truth is that the two sexes are not fungible; a com-
munity made up exclusively of one is different from one composed of both; the
subtle interplay of influence on the other is among the imponderables.
Id. at 193.
28 U.S.C. § 1861 provides:
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Years later, the Supreme Court held in Taylor v. Louisiana4 7 that the
systematic exclusion of women from a state venire violated the male
defendant's right to a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the com-
munity as required by the Sixth Amendment.4" The exclusion of a gen-
der from jury service infringes defendant's right to an impartial trial
under the Sixth Amendment. 9
Though race and gender discrimination are often equated,5" the pro-
hibition against race-based discrimination has advanced farther than
gender discrimination, beyond the venire selection stage and into the
realm of peremptory challenges. Cases consistently hold race-based
discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges violate the Equal
Protection Clause.51 The federal appeals courts are divided on the is-
sue of gender-based peremptory strikes.5 2 Some courts have extended
Batson and held that equal protection principles apply to gender-based
It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in Federal courts entitled to
trials by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from
a fair cross section of the community in the district or division wherein the court
convenes. It is further the policy of the United States that all citizens shall have
the opportunity to be considered for service on grand and petit juries...
28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1988). Accordingly, this Act provides that all citizens, regardless of
sex, are competent to sit on federal juries. Before the Civil Rights Act of 1957, federal
courts applied the exclusionary standard legislated by the state in which the federal
court sat. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 536 (1975).
47. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
48. Id. at 526-33.
49. Id. at 535-37 (overruling Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961)).
The statute at issue in Taylor read: "A woman shall not be selected for jury service
unless she has previously filed with the clerk of court of the parish in which she resides a
written declaration of her desire to be subject to jury service." Id. at 523 n.2.
The court rejected the argument that women served a "distinctive" role in the com-
munity and that jury service would interfere with their responsibilities in that regard.
Id. at 533-35. In conclusion, the court ruled that "the selection of a petit jury from a
representative cross section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial." Id. at 528. But see Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S.
162 (1986) (holding that the selection of the petit jury is not subject to the Sixth Amend-
ment's fair cross-section requirement).
50. "[T]hroughout much of the 19th century the position of women in our society
was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave
codes." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). Discrimination on the basis
of race and gender are analogous in that "sex, like race, . . . is an immutable characteris-
tic determined solely by the accident of birth .... " Id. at 687.
51. See supra notes 18-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of the line of cases
holding that discrimination on the basis of race when exercising peremptory challenges
violates the Equal Protection Clause.
52. The state courts have also come to differing conclusions as to whether gender-
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peremptory challenges.53 Other courts have refused to apply the lan-
guage of Batson so as to prohibit gender-based peremptory
challenges.5 4
In United States v. Hamilton55 the Fourth Circuit concluded that the
Supreme Court's opinion in Batson 6 did not support the extension of
gender-based discrimination to peremptory challenges because the de-
cision focused strictly on race discrimination. 7 The Fourth Circuit
acknowledged that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits gender dis-
crimination in certain contexts, but saw no evidence in the holding of
based peremptory challenges are unconstitutional. See infra notes 53 and 58 for illus-
trative cases.
53. See, e.g., United States v. DeGross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1437-39 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that the Equal Protection Clause proscribes gender-based peremptory strikes);
DiDonato v. Santini, 283 Cal. Rptr. 751, 760-61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that a
civil litigant may not exclude jurors on the basis of their gender when exercising per-
emptory challenges because such exclusions violate principles of equal protection under
both the federal and state constitutions); New York v. Irizarry, 560 N.Y.S.2d 279, 280
(N.Y. App. Div. 1990)(holding that a prosecutor's gender-based peremptory challenges
to exclude eight women violated a male defendant's equal protection rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment); State v. Burch, 820 P.2d 357, 361-63 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that both federal and state equal protection principles prohibit peremptory
challenges exercised on the basis of gender).
Several state courts have found that gender-based peremptory challenges violate the
equal protection clause of their state constitutions. See State v. Levinson, 795 P.2d 845,
849-50 (Haw. 1990) (holding that male defendant's exclusion of women jurors based on
their gender denied them equal protection as guaranteed under the Hawaiian Constitu-
tion); Commonwealth v. Hyatt, 568 N.E.2d 1148, 1149-50 (Mass. 1991) (finding that
gender-based peremptory challenges are precluded under the state constitution); State v.
Gonzales, 808 P.2d 40, 49 (N.M. App. 1991) (holding that the state constitution was
violated when the prosecution used eight out of eight peremptory challenges to exclude
Hispanic males); People v. Blunt, 561 N.Y.S.2d 90, 92 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (holding
that when the prosecution used eleven out of twelve peremptory challenges to exclude
women, the male defendant's equal protection rights under the state constitution were
violated).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257, 1264 (7th Cir. 1991) (analyz-
ing only possible race-based challenges under Batson, while rejecting inquiry into possi-
ble gender-based challenges); United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1988)
(refusing to extend Batson to cover gender-based peremptory challenges). See also infra
note 58 for a listing of state courts that have refused to extend Batson.
55. 850 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed, sub nom. Washington v. United
States, 489 U.S. 1094 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990).
56. See supra notes 23-33 for a discussion of the Batson case.
57. 850 F.2d at 1042. In Hamilton, the Fourth Circuit held that the prosecution
overcame the defendant's prima facie showing of racial discrimination in the striking of
three black female jurors by presenting the race-neutral explanation that they were
struck because they were women. Id. at 1041.
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Batson that required equal protection principles to apply to the exer-
cise of peremptory challenges. "8 The Hamilton Court also noted the
58. Id. at 1042. The court reasoned:
While the strictures of the Equal Protection Clause undoubtedly apply to prohibit
discrimination due to gender in other contexts, there is no evidence to suggest that
the Supreme Court would apply normal equal protection principles to the unique
situation involving peremptory challenges.
Clearly, if the Supreme Court in Batson had desired, it could have abolished the
peremptory challenge or prohibited the exercise of the challenges on the basis of
race, gender, age or other group classification.
Id.
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island used reasoning similar to Hamilton in State v.
Oliviera, 534 A.2d 867 (R.I. 1987). In Oliviera, the defendant questioned the prosecu-
tion's use of six out of seven peremptory strikes to remove males. Id. at 869. The court
concluded that Batson did not extend to gender-based discrimination, finding that
"[o]ne of the purposes of the Batson decision was to cure the long history of discrimina-
tion faced by Blacks during jury selection." Id. at 870. Unlike Blacks as a group, males
as a group have not been historically discriminated against during jury selection. Id.
The court thought that adding gender discrimination as a criterion would make all
peremptory challenges "suspect," thus greatly damaging the peremptory challenge pro-
cedure. d
Other state courts have refused to extend Batson to cover gender-based peremptory
challenges. See, eg., Daniels v. State, 581 So.2d 536, 538-39 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990)
(holding that the State's use of nine peremptory challenges to exclude women from the
jury did not violate male defendant's constitutional right to equal protection); Stariks v.
State, 572 So.2d 1301, 1302-03 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (finding that the prosecutor's
exclusion of male jurors in order to impanel an exclusively female jury in a sexual abuse
case did not violate male defendant's equal protection rights); Hannan v. Common-
wealth, 774 S.W.2d 462, 464 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that Batson does not extend
to gender-based peremptory challenges); State v. Morgan, 553 So.2d 1012, 1018 (La. Ct.
App. 1989) (holding that the prohibition against discriminatory use of peremptory
strikes applies only to racial discrimination); State v. Adams, 533 So.2d 1060, 1063 (La.
Ct. App. 1988) (finding that a female defendant was not denied Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection by the prosecution's discriminatory peremptory strikes of all male
venirepersons); Eiland v. State, 607 A.2d 42, 59 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (determining
that, although the State used sixteen of its twenty peremptory strikes to strike females,
Batson's equal protection analysis does not extend to gender-based peremptory chal-
lenges discrimination); State v. Clay, 779 S.W.2d 673, 676 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (finding
that Batson applies only to race discrimination, and that women are not a cognizable
racial group); State v. Culver, 444 N.W.2d 662, 666 (Neb. 1989) (finding that the Equal
Protection Clause does not prohibit gender-based peremptory challenges).
The Courts in Illinois are split on the issue. Compare People v. Mitchell, 593 N.E.2d
882 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that a defendant has both federal and state constitu-
tional rights to a jury selected in a non-gender discriminatory fashion) with People v.
Hooper, 552 N.E.2d 684, 701 (I. 1989) (stating in dictum that "using peremptory
challenges to form a more gender-balanced panel is an acceptable, non-racial use of a
peremptory challenge"); People v. Thomas, 559 N.E.2d 262 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (hold-
ing that Batson limited the prohibition against discriminatory peremptory challenges to
only race).
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importance of peremptory challenges within the jury system.59 The
Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Nichols," also refused to extend
Batson to encompass the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges
on the basis of gender.6
Another line of decisions follows the reasoning of De Gross and finds
gender-based peremptory challenges violative of equal protection prin-
ciples.62 The De Gross court took a broader view of Batson and its
progeny than did the Hamilton court. After determining that the gov-
ernment had standing to object to the defendant's peremptory chal-
lenge,63 the De Gross court reasoned that the same "evils" that result
from race-based peremptory strikes were inherent in gender-based per-
emptory strikes."4 First, gender-based strikes harm the excluded
59. Id. at 1042-43. Other cases and authorities have similarly commented on the
importance of peremptory challenges. See, eg., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219
(1965) (noting the "long and widely held belief that peremptory challenge is a necessary
part of trial by jury"); State v. Oliviera, 534 A.2d 867, 870 (R.I. 1987) (finding that
Batson does not extend to gender discrimination because if it did, "[t]he damage to the
peremptory challenge, a vital component of trial by jury, would be enormous, if not
fatal"); See also Babcock, supra note 2, at 553-54 (noting that "[t]he symbolic-educa-
tive, impartiality-promoting role of the peremptory challenge makes it central to the
jury trial right").
60. 937 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1991).
61. Id. at 1262. The court found that the prosecution's race-neutral explanations
for striking three black female jurors complied with Batson, and that gender-neutral
explanations were not required. Id. at 1264.
62. See supra note 53 for cases that have found gender-based peremptory challenges
to violate equal protection. See also Jere W. Morehead, Exploring the Frontiers of Bat-
son v. Kentucky: Should the Safeguards of Equal Protection Extend to Gender?, 14 AM.
J. TRIAL ADVOc. 289 (1990) (advocating extension of Batson to prohibit gender-based
discrimination in jury selection).
63. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1436-37. The De Gross court reasoned:
[T]he government has an interest in having its criminal prosecutions tried before a
tribunal most likely to produce a fair result. Thus, when a criminal defendant
attempts to achieve a jury partial to her through discriminatory peremptory
strikes, the government suffers injury. We view this injury as sufficient to confer
standing upon the government to object to the defendant's challenge.
Id. (citations omitted).
The De Gross court also found that the government had standing to assert the equal
protection rights of the excluded jurors. Id. at 1437. Applying the test provided in
Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1370-72 (1991), the Court found that (1) the excluded
jurors suffer an actual harm, (2) the government's relationship with the excluded
venirepersons is sufficient to ensure that it will vigorously defend their rights, and (3)
the improperly excluded jurors confront obstacles which hinder their ability to assert
their own rights. 960 F.2d at 1437.
64. Id. at 1438. See supra note 17 for a quotation of the court's reasoning.
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venirepersons because their qualifications to be jurors are totally ig-
nored.6 5 Second, gender-based strikes hinder full community partici-
pation, and without total participation, public confidence in the judicial
system is undermined. 66 Third, discriminatory strikes perpetuate com-
munity prejudice toward those who are excluded. 67 Finally, the use of
gender-based peremptory challenges violates the defendant's right to
equal protection of the laws, for a defendant is entitled to be tried by a
jury selected nondiscriminatorily.68
The De Gross court recognized that gender discrimination is permis-
sible when it is substantially related to achieving important governmen-
tal objectives. 69 The court noted that the use of peremptory strikes
furthers the "important governmental objective" of impaneling a fair
and impartial jury.7 ° The court viewed gender-based challenges, how-
ever, as based not on a subjective impression that a prospective juror
may be biased, but, like race-based challenges, on either a determina-
tion that members of a certain group are unqualified to serve as ju-
rors7 1 or a blanket condemnation that members of a certain group are
partial.72 De Gross concluded that these erroneous assumptions are
not legitimate means of achieving the "important governmental objec-
tive" of impaneling an impartial jury.73
After determining that a criminal defendant is a state actor when
exercising peremptory challenges,74 the De Gross court considered
65. Id. at 1439.
66. Id. "A jury is not truly representative of the community unless both sexes have
an equal opportunity to serve." Id. (citing Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193-
94 (1946)).
67. Id. at 1438. "Permitting gender-based peremptory challenges would simply af-
firm an erroneous and unconstitutional presumption that women are less qualified than
men to serve as jurors." Id.
68. 960 F.2d at 1438.
69. Id. at 1439 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)). See also supra
notes 41-43 and accompanying text for discussion of the standard of review for gender-
based classifications.
70. 960 F.2d at 1439 (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 211-12 (1965)).
71. Id. (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986)).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1439.
74. See also supra note 15 discussing the McCollom case, in which the Supreme
Court held that a criminal defendant's use of peremptory challenges constitutes state
action.
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whether the defendant's peremptory challenge was gender-based.7"
Noting that males are a constitutionally cognizable group 76 and that
the defendant exercised seven out of eight strikes against males, the
court agreed with the district court that the defendant's challenges
were on account of gender.77 The De Gross court concluded that the
district court properly denied the defendant's challenge when the bur-
den of proof shifted to the defendant, who failed to justify the challenge
on neutral grounds.78
In addition, the court of appeals in De Gross found that the defend-
ant demonstrated a prima facie case of gender discrimination. 79 The
prosecutor explained to the district court that his peremptory challenge
of a Hispanic venirewoman was because he desired a jury of more
men.80 The court stated that this was an admission of purposeful gen-
der discrimination and, thus, a violation of the defendant's right to
equal protection.81 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that the dis-
trict court improperly struck the venirewoman from the jury. 2
Although the De Gross decision is correct, eliminating discrimina-
tory peremptory challenges is not without pragmatic concerns.8 3 As a
result of the De Gross decision, attorneys must monitor not only oppos-
ing counsel's peremptory strikes in order to detect possible race-based
or gender-based discriminatory patterns, but must also remain cogni-
zant of their own strikes in order to avoid the appearance of discrimi-
75. 960 F.2d at 1442. See also supra text accompanying notes 27-33 presenting the
elements necessary to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination.
76. 960 F.2d at 1449. See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976) (noting
that statutory classifications that distinguish between males and females must pass
heightened scrutiny); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971) (holding that statutes prefer-
encing males or females are subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause).
77. 960 F.2d at 1442.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1443.
80. Id.
81. 960 F.2d 1443.
82. Id.
83. Some authorities claim that the objective to do away with discriminatory per-
emptory challenges is theoretically impossible. Blackstone recognized centuries ago the
prejudices of individuals. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 2. Because peremptory chal-
lenges are inherently based on prejudice, any effort to remove the prejudices by prohibit-
ing discriminatory challenges may prove futile. Some argue that, ultimately, the
abolition of peremptory challenges may be warranted. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. at 108 (Marshall, J., concurring) (agreeing with the Court in Batson but noting
that "only by banning peremptories entirely can such discrimination be ended").
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nation. The order in which the members of the venire are presented
becomes increasingly important. Gender, unlike race in an increas-
ingly multi-racial society, is limited to a dichotomy of roughly equal
proportions. To avoid the appearance of gender discrimination, counsel
in effect is compelled to impanel a relatively gender-balanced jury.
In addition, counsel bent on discrimination will be tempted to create
fallacious, but otherwise acceptable, reasons for striking an "undesir-
able" juror.84 The trial judge is then required to second-guess coun-
sel's motives.8 5 The trial judge is also placed in a difficult position
because the appellate courts gave little guidance as to what constitutes
a pattern of discrimination. The Supreme Court explicitly delegated
trial courts with the discretion to develop evidentiary rules for proving
prima facie cases of discrimination. 6 It is unclear how many strikes
against members of a cognizable group are sufficient to establish a
pattern.8 7
84. The Supreme Court noted this concern in the context of race discrimination:
Any prosecutor can easily assert facially neutral reasons for striking a juror, and
trial courts are ill equipped to second-guess those reasons. How is the court to
treat a prosecutor's statement that he struck a juror because the juror had a son
about the same age as defendant, or seemed "uncommunicative," or "never
cracked a smile" and, therefore "did not possess the sensitivities necessary to realis-
tically look at the issues and decide that facts in this case?" If such easily gener-
ated explanations are sufficient to discharge the prosecutor's obligation to justify
his strikes on nonracial grounds, then the protection erected today by the Court
today may be illusory.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
85. See Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1866 (1991) (discussing the trial
court's necessary inquiry into the validity of the prosecution's race-neutral explanation).
86. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2088-89 (1991) (directing
courts to consider all the relevant circumstances in determining whether the facts indi-
cate a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the striking of potential jurors); Bat-
son v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 96-97 (directing trial courts to consider whether criminal
defendants have made their prima facie showing of racially-discriminatory use of per-
emptory challenges).
87. [D]efendants cannot attack the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges
at all unless the challenges are so flagrant as to establish a prima facie case. This
means, in those States, that where only one or two black jurors survive the chal-
lenges for cause, the prosecutor need have no compunction about striking them
from the jury because of their race. Prosecutors are left free to discriminate against
blacks in jury selection provided that they hold that discrimination to an "accepta-
ble" level.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 105 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
If the jurisdiction allows only for a six-member jury, it may be virtually impossible to
detect a pattern of discriminatory peremptory strikes. See State v. Morgan, 553 So.2d
1012 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that the prosecution did not violate the defendants'
equal protection rights by using peremptory challenges to exclude males; the State
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Another effect of extending Batson is that every constitutionally cog-
nizable group falls within the penumbra of those protected from dis-
criminatory peremptory challenges."8 The possibility of multiple
objections to peremptory challenges based upon a variety of potentially
discriminatory grounds may slow down the trial process and contrib-
ute to courts' backlog. 9 Furthermore, repeated accusations of dis-
crimination by counsel may distract the courtroom proceedings.
Despite the alleged negative effects of extending Batson to cover gen-
der-based peremptory challenges, the main objective of equal protec-
tion cannot be overlooked. It is illogical to limit Batson to only race
discrimination, for the reasoning used to support the prohibition
against race-based discrimination is also applicable in the context of
gender-based discrimination.' Even administrative concerns do not
justify upholding discriminatory conduct.9 The De Gross court ac-
knowledged the unreasonableness of limiting protection to only racial
minorities and set precedent that discrimination in peremptory chal-
lenges, whether based on gender or race, will not be tolerated under
modem principles of equal protection. 92
John S. Lapham*
struck both males and females, yet only one male served on the six-member jury to hear
an obscenity case).
88. "[I]f conventional equal protection principles apply, then presumably defend-
ants could object to exclusions on the basis of not only race, but also sex, age, religious
or political affiliation, mental capacity, number of children, living arrangements and
employment in a particular industry, or profession." Batson, 476 U.S. at 124 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
89. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Ill S. Ct. 2077, 2095-96 (1991)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("We have now added to the duties of already-submerged state
and federal trial courts the obligation to assure that race is not included among the
other factors (sex, age, religion, political views, economic status) used by private parties
in exercising their peremptory challenges."). But see Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 ("In those
States applying a version of the evidentiary standard we recognize today, courts have
not experienced serious administrative burdens, and the peremptory challenge system
has survived.") (Footnote omitted).
90. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text for discussion of how discrimina-
tory peremptory challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause.
91. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (rejecting administrative
convenience as an important governmental objective that justifies gender-based
classifications).
92. See supra notes 63-82 and accompanying text discussing the De Gross court's
rationale.
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